On November 3, 2026, NVD received CVE-2026-112354, a hard-coded default credentials flaw in the web management interface of Etrel INCH AC charging stations. The scenario is simple: a known factory account gives full administrator access to the charger. And what it exposes goes beyond the charger itself, reaching its OCPP identity and the connection settings for the operator's central management system.
The vulnerability
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-112354 |
| Product | Etrel INCH AC, web management interface |
| Versions | firmware prior to 7.1.2 and 8.0.1 |
| Type | Hard-coded default credentials (CWE-1392) |
| CVSS 3.1 | 9.8 — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| CVSS 4.0 | 9.3 |
| Score source | VulnCheck (CNA) |
| NVD status | Received (not yet analyzed) |
| CISA KEV | no, at the time of writing |
NVD hasn't published its own assessment or a CPE configuration, so the scores are VulnCheck's.
What the flaw allows
According to the NVD description, a remote attacker gets full Administrator access by logging into the web interface with the factory-default account. The login happens over cleartext HTTP. Once in, the attacker can read:
- the charger's complete configuration;
- its OCPP ChargePoint Identity, the identifier the station uses toward the central system;
- the CSMS WebSocket connection details (the operator-side charging station management system).
The outcome is unauthorized administrative control of the charging station.
Two things are worth spelling out. First, the OCPP identity and CSMS settings are what tie the charger to the operator's platform. The description stops at their disclosure. One could infer they might be used to impersonate the charger toward the CSMS, but that's our hypothesis, not something the description states. Second, cleartext HTTP means that even a changed password travels readable across the charger's network.
Fixed versions
The description covers firmware prior to 7.1.2 and 8.0.1, which points to two branches: 7.x, fixed in 7.1.2, and 8.x, fixed in 8.0.1. NVD publishes no CPE configuration detailing these bounds. The reference to follow is the vendor's INCH firmware page cited by NVD: Etrel INCH Firmware.
Detection
- Inventory: firmware version of every INCH AC charger, and which branch (7.x or 8.x).
- Exposure: is the web management interface reachable from the internet, or from a shared network (parking lot, guest Wi-Fi)? Checking each site's public address answers that.
- Admin logins to the interface that nobody made.
- Changed configuration: CSMS URL, ChargePoint identity, network or pricing settings.
- On the CSMS side: the same ChargePoint identity connected from two addresses, or a charger reconnecting from an unexpected address.
Mitigation
- Update the firmware to 7.1.2 or 8.0.1 depending on the branch, following Etrel's firmware page.
- Change the admin account password if the interface allows it, without waiting for the update.
- Take the web interface off any public exposure: chargers belong on a dedicated network that only the operator can reach.
- Rotate OCPP secrets on the CSMS for chargers that may have been exposed, if the operator supports it.
- Isolate the chargers from the office network: a parking-lot charger has no reason to see workstations.
Why continuously monitor your site equipment
Charging stations are installed by facilities teams or contractors, rarely inventoried by IT, yet they sit on the network. That's the textbook profile of a device that keeps its factory credentials for years.
With cveo.tech, add your chargers and their firmware versions to your inventory, and get alerted as soon as a critical CVE affects them.