On November 9, 2026, CISA added two pieces of self-hosted open source software to its KEV catalog: GPUStack, a GPU cluster manager for serving AI models, and FreeSWITCH, a software telephony stack. Both are due November 12.
Functionally, they have nothing in common. But in both cases the NVD description itself states that exploitation has been observed, and in both cases the bug turns ordinary network access into control of the application, then of the host.
| Software | CVE | CVSS 3.1 (GitHub, CNA) | Bug class | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPUStack | CVE-2026-102895 | 9.8 | Authentication bypass (CWE-287, CWE-290, CWE-346) | 2.2.0 |
| FreeSWITCH | CVE-2026-116779 | 9.8 | Command injection (CWE-77, CWE-78, CWE-749) | 1.11.3 |
Both scores come from the GitHub advisories (CNA); NVD lists both entries as Analyzed. Same vector for both: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
GPUStack — CVE-2026-102895
NVD published: November 4, 2026. Added to KEV: November 9.
How it works
In GPUStack before 2.2.0, get_current_user (gpustack/api/auth.py) treated any request coming from loopback as the built-in administrator, as long as force_auth_localhost was false — which was the default.
The trouble lies in how the source was determined. Per NVD, client_ip_getter accepted:
- a reverse proxy on the same host as the peer: behind a local nginx, every request looks like it comes from
127.0.0.1; - a client-supplied
X-GPUStack-Real-IPheader carrying a loopback value.
So a remote request could pass itself off as local and get administrator rights with no credentials at all.
What that buys an attacker
NVD spells out the consequences: user and model changes, creation of a persistent administrator API key, disclosure of worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml.
NVD notes that exploitation was observed against a 2.1.1 deployment.
The persistent API key is the nasty part: upgrading closes the door, but a key minted during the exposure window keeps working. Same for leaked cloud credentials — they are usable well outside GPUStack.
Versions
NVD: every version before 2.2.0 (excluded bound). Both the description and the release note in the references point to 2.2.0 as the fix.
FreeSWITCH — CVE-2026-116779
NVD published: November 5, 2026. Added to KEV: November 9. Vendor listed in KEV: SignalWire.
How it works
Before 1.11.3, sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message() split the To user of an inbound SIP MESSAGE on the + sign and treated the left-hand side as a chat protocol selector. Picking the api protocol led straight to switch_api_execute(): whoever sent the message could run FreeSWITCH API commands, including ones that execute OS commands, with the daemon's privileges.
The preconditions — and why they're weak
- Inbound chat is enabled on the stock
internalandexternalprofiles. - Any authenticated profile account is enough to get the MESSAGE accepted.
- Per NVD, stock directory users without password material can remove even that barrier in some configurations.
Hence the PR:N in the vector. On a phone system, a SIP account is not an admin account — it's a handset, whose credentials are often provisioned in plain text on the device.
Impact per NVD: configuration and credential disclosure, arbitrary call control, command execution. On a telephony server, call control translates directly into money: premium-rate calls, toll fraud.
Versions
NVD: every version before 1.11.3. FreeSWITCH is also embedded in other telephony products, and CISA flags this in the KEV notes. If you run a solution built on it, ask its vendor which FreeSWITCH version it ships.
This is the second VoIP product added to KEV in two months, after Sangoma Switchvox in September.
Detection
GPUStack
- Administrator API keys nobody created; users added or modified
- Requests carrying an
X-GPUStack-Real-IPheader in reverse proxy logs - Calls to
/v2/inference-backends/from-yaml; unknown inference backends - Unusual use of the configured cloud credentials (check the provider's audit logs)
FreeSWITCH
- SIP MESSAGE requests whose recipient contains
api+in packet captures or SIP logs - Unusual API commands in FreeSWITCH logs; unexpected child processes of the daemon
- Outbound calls to unusual or international destinations, outside business hours
Mitigation
GPUStack
- Upgrade to 2.2.0.
- Until then, enforce authentication on local requests (
force_auth_localhostset totrue) and have the reverse proxy strip theX-GPUStack-Real-IPheader. - After upgrading: revoke every API key, review the user list, and rotate worker and cloud-provider secrets.
FreeSWITCH
- Upgrade to 1.11.3.
- Until then, disable inbound chat on profiles that don't need it, and make sure no directory user lacks a password.
- Don't expose SIP profiles to the Internet without filtering; rotate SIP passwords and any credentials stored in the configuration.
For both, CISA requires forensic triage (BOD 26-04): upgrading removes neither an attacker-created API key nor anything dropped on the host.
Why continuous monitoring of self-hosted software matters
GPUStack and FreeSWITCH don't go through an enterprise patch manager: a team installed them one day and they've been running ever since. That is exactly the kind of software that drops out of inventory — just like LiteLLM back in the spring.
With cveo.tech, add your self-hosted software to your inventory with its version, and get an alert as soon as a CVE affecting it is published or lands in the CISA KEV catalog.