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Cyrus SASL: The SRP Mechanism Accepts A = N, Letting Anyone Log In as Any User (CVE-2026-129483)

CVE-2026-129483: in Cyrus SASL through 2.1.28, the SRP plugin accepts a client value A that is a multiple of N, forcing a zero secret. Impact and mitigation.

4 min readCVE-2026-129483

On November 15, 2026, VulnCheck (acting as CNA) filed CVE-2026-129483 in NVD, an authentication bypass in Cyrus SASL, the authentication library behind many Linux mail servers and directories. The flaw sits in the SRP mechanism: an unauthenticated network client can log in as any existing user without knowing the password, and learn the session keys along the way.

CVECVE-2026-129483
ComponentCyrus SASL, SRP plugin (plugins/srp.c, srp_server_mech_step2)
Versionsthrough 2.1.28
FlawImproper authentication (CWE-287)
CVSS 3.19.1 (VulnCheck), AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS 4.09.3 (VulnCheck)
NVD statusReceived (not yet analyzed, no CPE configuration)
CISA KEVno, at the time of writing

How it works: one missing math check

SRP (Secure Remote Password) is a password-based authentication protocol that never sends the password over the wire. Client and server exchange public values computed modulo a large prime N, and each side derives a shared secret on its own. The client's public value is called A.

The SRP specification requires the server to reject any A that is 0 modulo N (A = 0, A = N, A = 2N, and so on). If A is a multiple of N, the shared secret the server computes is zero, regardless of the password.

According to the NVD description, srp_server_mech_step2 skips that check. An attacker just sends A = N:

  1. the server computes a zero shared secret;
  2. the attacker, knowing this, computes the same zero secret and produces a valid authentication proof;
  3. the server accepts them as any existing user they pick, and the attacker holds the session keys.

So the impact is twofold: identity takeover and loss of confidentiality for the negotiated session. VulnCheck's vector rates confidentiality and integrity High, availability None.


Who is actually exposed

The key point: only services that offer the SRP mechanism are affected. Cyrus SASL is modular. Each mechanism (PLAIN, SCRAM, GSSAPI, SRP...) is a separately loaded plugin, and which ones a service advertises depends on its configuration and on the installed packages.

SRP isn't the most common mechanism, and many distributions don't build or package it by default. That's a general observation, not something NVD states, so check your own systems rather than assume.

Services that typically sit on top of Cyrus SASL include Cyrus IMAP/POP servers, MTAs such as Postfix or Sendmail for SMTP AUTH, and OpenLDAP. If any of them advertises SRP in its mechanism list, it's exposed.


Affected versions and fix

NVD says "through 2.1.28", meaning every version up to and including 2.1.28. The description doesn't name a fixed release. The references include a fix commit in the cyrusimap/cyrus-sasl repository, issue 896 in the same repository, the VulnCheck advisory and an oss-security mailing list post.

In practice, most people will get the fix through their distribution's packages. Watch your distribution's security advisories for CVE-2026-129483 rather than waiting for a new upstream release.


Detection

  • Is the SRP plugin installed? Look for libsrp in the SASL plugin directory (often /usr/lib/sasl2/ or /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/).
  • Is it advertised? On an SMTP server, the EHLO response lists mechanisms after AUTH. On IMAP, the CAPABILITY response lists them as AUTH=. On LDAP, check the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute of the Root DSE.
  • Logs: successful SRP authentications from unusual addresses, or on accounts that never use that mechanism.

Mitigation

1. Drop SRP from the mechanism list

This is the immediate, low-risk fix if nobody uses SRP. Depending on the service, the mech_list option in the SASL configuration (for example in smtpd.conf or imapd.conf) restricts which mechanisms are allowed. Removing the package or the SRP plugin has the same effect.

2. Apply your distribution's patch

As soon as it ships, then restart every service that loads the library: a plugin already loaded in memory stays vulnerable until the restart.

3. If SRP was offered and reachable

Assume sessions may have been opened under any user's identity. Review mailbox and directory access over the period, and look for unusual authenticated SMTP submissions.


Why continuous monitoring matters for system libraries

Cyrus SASL never shows up in an application inventory: it's a dependency that comes with the mail server and gets forgotten. And until NVD analyzes it, CVE-2026-129483 has no CPE configuration, so no product search will surface it.

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